Hume †Concerning Human Understanding.David Hume’S...

Hume – Concerning Human Understanding David Hume’s epistemological argument revolves around an empiricist school of thought, where sense impressions and experience are the foundations of human knowledge and understanding. Hume’s concept of human reason or enquiry is divided into two types, relation of ideas, which are propositions that are intuitively certain, and matters of fact, which depend on existents for their evidence (Hume 1993: 15). This paper will outline Hume’s argument against conclusions about cause and effect being based on reason, as well as the consequences that accompany this method of knowledge. Finally, I will conclude by explaining why I disagree with Hume’s philosophy. The main argument concerning Hume’s†¦show more content†¦Furthermore, based on that observed phenomena, we can infer future phenomena of similar nature. More specifically, we can base our knowledge of future events by recalling past experiences (Hu me 1993: 21). Hume’s concept of cause and effect, however, does not come without consequences. These consequences are tied to logical reasoning regarding an event. In other words, we merely think that a fact is a fact because we assume that fact is caused by a previous experience. Furthermore, we assume events regarding cause and effect simply because we have witnessed similar events occur in the past, and therefore the same conclusion must follow. However, this is where the implication lies, that there is no logical reason to assume that an event or thing is caused by another, the only evidence we have of such an event is experience itself (Hume 1993: 22). To further clarify, Hume uses the example of a loaf of bread. A loaf of bread has certain consistency, weight, texture, as well as nourishment that follows its consumption. Hume claims that inferring that an object that we see in the future that has the same characteristics as the loaf of bread we first saw, so it must fol low that eating it will also provide us with nourishment (Hume 1993: 22-23). The problem